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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

-vLYNN DELL NOREN,

Case No. 16018

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal from the conviction by jury
verdict for the charge of Fraudulent Handling of a Recordable
Document in violation of §76-6-503, Utah Code Annotated,
as amended, 1973, in the Third Judicial District, the
Honorable Bryant H. Croft, judge presiding.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant was convicted by jury verdict rendered
July 17. 1978, and sentenced to the Utah State Prison
for the indeterminate

term as provided by law of 0-5 years

and a fine of $5,000.00 on August 18, 1978.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have this cause reversed
and remanded to the trial court for appropriate action and
dismissal of the charge set forth in the information.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Of the seven counts originally charged against
the defendant in the complaint (R. 8-10), six were dismissed

by the Salt Lake City Court, Judge Robert C. Gibson, for
insufficient evidence (R. 3-4), leaving the defendant bound
over to be tried on the charge set forth in the information
of Fraudulent Handling of a Recordable Document, a felony
of the third degree, in violation of §76-6-503, U.C.A., as
amended, 1973, to wit:
That on or about the 22nd day of January, 1976,
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the said
Lynn Dell Noren Falsified the Articles of
incorporation of Nordell Financial Services, a
writing for which the law provides public recording, with the intent to injure or deceive.
(R.

11)

Prior to presentation of evidence on behalf of
the state and pursuant to the Appellant's written motion
filed with the Court prior to commencement of the proceedings (R. 56, T. 118) counsel for Appellant presented
oral argument to quash

or dismiss the information by

reason of its failure to charge the Appellant with an
offense.

Simply

pu~

counsel argued that articles of

incorporation, being documents "filed" with the Secretary
of State, are not documents "for which the law provides
public recording."

(R.

199-130)

-2-
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The Court held

as a matter of law that the phrase

. . or other writing for which the law provides public
recording.

" includes within its meaning c, "t"ticle s of

incorporation and therefore the act of falsifying Articles
of Incorporation and filing the same with the Secretary of
State falls within the ambit of the statute charged, §76-6-503
supra.
In support of the allegation the State first called
Raymond Bishop, who testified that the signature of one
of the incorporators of Nordell Financial Services on its
Articles of Incorporation (Ex. S-1) purporting to be in his
hand was in fact not his and that he had given no one authOLity
to sign his name as an incorporator thereof.

(T. 149, 1. 1-13)

Upon stipulation of counsel the state then introduced
a transcript of the sworn testimony of Fawn Noren, (Ex. 7-5),
wherein she stated that she had not signed nor did she recall
granting authority to anyone to sign her name as an incorporator
of Nordell Financial Services (Ex. S-1).
Robert Grube, a handwriting analyst, testified
for the State that in his opinion the author of the names
"Fawn Noren" and "Ray Bishop," appearing as incorporators
of Nordell Financial Services, was the defendant, Lynn Dell
Noren.

-3-
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Ron Ferguson testified, without illuminating
effect as to the merits of the allegation, that he notarized
the signatures of the three incorporators names:
Noren, I.P. Ozawa, and Ray Bishop.

Fawn

(T. 177)

Attorney Byron Fisher then testified on behalf
of the State that he prepared the Articles of Incorporation
(Ex. 1-S) as a result of a conference with the Appellant
(T. 212-213).

Important to the issues presented is the

following cross-examination of Mr. Fisher:
Q.: Mr. Fisher, do you know of any limitation,
as a matter of law, where a principal in filing a
corporation with the State of Utah must disclose
in any manner his principalship in that corporation?
A.:

I know of no law that requires that.

Q.: In other words, if I were to form a corporation
today, I need not disclose in any manner the fact
that I am the owner of the corporation because I
own all of the stock or I will after it is
incorporated and after it is funded; is that correct? '
A.: That is a correct statement and my understanding
of the law.
Q.:

I need not be a director; is that correct?

A.: That is correct.
(T. 217-218)
Based upon this state of the evidence, the state
rested its case.

(T. 223)

Thereupon defense counsel moved

for a directed verdict on the grounds that the State had failed
to establish a prima facie case, specifically , that there
was no evidence of intent to deceive or injure anyone by the ac:
of falsifying the names on the documents.

(T 223-224, 223-226)
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Subsequent to the Appellants defense caseand
the State's rebuttal, the matter was submitted to the jury as
charged over the defendant's objection that the matter
should have gone to the jury not on the felony as charged
in §76-6-503 supra, but upon the lesser included offence
contained within §76-6-504, U.C.A. as amended,

~73,-

(T. 391-392).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT ARTICLES OF
INCORPORATION ARE " ... A WRITING FOR WHICH THE
LAW PROVIDES PUBLIC RECORDING ... " WITHIN THE
MEANING OF §76-6-504, U.C.A. 1973, AS AMENDED,
AND FURTHER ERRED IN DENYING APPELL&~T'S MOTION
TO QUASH OR DISMISS THE INFORMATION FOR FAILURE
TO STATE A PUBLIC OFFENSE.
There is a crucial distinction between what is
"recorded" and what is merely "filed",

as those terms are

used in the Statutes of the State of Utah.

Specifically

with regard to Articles of Incorporation the legislature
has provided that, among the other general duties of the
Secretary of State, there shall be the requirement as set
forth in §67-2-2(4), U.C.A., 1975, as amended:
To record in proper books all conveyances made
to the state, and to file all articles of
incorporation entitle~ be filed in his office.
(emphasis supplied)

-5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Throughout the fourteen subsections §67-2-2, i.d.,
which delineate

the various duties of the Secretary of State,

there is a studied and consistently maintained distinction
between those items which it is provided shall be filed,
received, deposited, taken , kept and those which shall be
recorded.

Interpreting the statute it would seem appropriate

and reasonable to conclude that for those matters upon
which members of the public might place heavy reliance,
the legislature provided for recording:
bonds of state officers, trade-marks.

conveyances, official
For other matters the

statute calls fora lesser or different kind of act:
receiving,

keepin~

filing,

et cetera.

The law is clear that Aritcles of Incorporation need
only be filed and not recorded:
..... If the Secretary of State finds that the
articles of incorporation conform to law, he
shall, when all fees have been paid as in this
act prescribed:
(1)
Endorse on each of such duplicate
originals the word "filed" and the month, day and
year of the filing thereof.
(2)
File one of such duplicate originals in
his office.
§16-10-50 U.C.A., 1961 as amended.
Although Articles of Incorporation may then be a "public
record", it cannot be said that the law has provided that
Articles Constitute a "writing for which the law provides
public recording'' as might be said of a deed, mortgage or
security instrument.

There is no particular emphasis to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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be placed on the fact of filing articles of incorporation
other than that by virtue of filing corporate existence
comes into being.

No particular notice of anything, save

perhaps the name of the corporation, is imparted and it would
be facetious to say that anyone, except the most naive, would
rely upon the names of the incorporators as set forth in the
filed copy of the articles for any purpose.

As the record

reflects ownership or directorship of the corporation are
not required by Utah law to be disclosed in any manner so
that any conflict of interest which might exist would in no way
be reflected by the articles.
The only document mentioned in §76-6-503 not like
a deed, mortgage, or security instrument is a will.

Although

provision is made for deposit of a will with the clerk of
the court for its confidential safe keeping, §75-2-901, U.C.A.,
1975, as amended, it is not a document for which "the law
provides public recording". There is an excellent reason for
this specific inclusion within §76-6-503, i.d.

The interest

in preserving the sanctity of a will, as distinguished
from almost any other type of document, is great enough to
warrent treatment of an offender of that sanctity with
punishment as a felony.

The same may be said of a deed, a

mortgage, a security instrument, or other writing for which
the law provides public recording as in the instance of an
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Agricultural Cooperative Association for which, in contradistinction to the garden variety corporation involved in
the instant matter, it is specifically set forth and
provided the method of recording. §3-1-6, U.C.A., 1961 as amendedl
Falsifying names of incorporators on an
articles of incorporation is not the type of crime intended
to be or in fact included within the crime charged in the
information and the charge falls short of fulfilling the
intendments of §76-6-503, i.d.

The information should

have been quashed or dismissed at trial.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED I~ SUBMITTING THE CASE TO
THE JURY AS A FELONY WHERE A CLEAR AND SPECIFIC
STATUTE CONTROLLING THE SAME CONDUCT EXACTING A
LESSER PENALTY EXISTS.
Falsifying, destroying, removing or concealing a
will or deed are patently more culpable acts than falsifying
the names of incorporators on an articles of incorporation.
Commensurate with the lesser degree of culpability the
legislature provided as follows for punishment as a class
B misdemeanor the crime of Tampering with Records:
(1)
Any person who, having no privilege to do so,
knowingly falsifies, destroys, removes or conceals
any writing, other than the writings enumerated in
section §76-6-503, or record, public or private,
with intent to deceive or injure any person or to
conceal any wrong doing is guilty of tampering
with records.
§76-6-504 U.C.A., 1973, amended.
No doubt articles of incorporation are a public record and
fall well within the purview of this statute.

Certainly to

the extent that there exists any confusion, the principles
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
enunciatedLibrary
by Services
longstanding
rules of statutory interpretation
and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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as well as rulings of this court establish the proposition that
when two statutes encompass like criminal conduct, the more
specific and clear statute is applicable as well as that containing the lesser penalty.

State v. Shondell, 22 Utah 2d

143, 453 P.2d 146 (1965); State v. Fair, 23 Utah 2d 34, 456
P.2d 168 (1969); Rammel v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1977)
State v. Loveless, 581 P.2d 575 (Utah 1978).

These cases stand

for the proposition that the clear, specific and lesser penalty
prescribed shall be applied when two statutes encompass the
same conduct.

In Shondell the Court also stated:

Related to the doctrine just stated is the rule
that when there is doubt or uncertainty as to
which of two punishments is :applicable to an
offense an accused is entitled to the benefit of
the lesser.
453 P.2d at 148
The conclusion follows that appellant was entitled
to have the case submitted to the jury on §76-6-504 i.d., a
misdemeanor, rather than §76-6-503, i.d., a felony.
POINT III
SECTION 76-6-503(1), AS CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION
VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSES OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE
l, SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION IN THAT IT IS
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VOID FOR VAGUENESS.
Section 76-6-503(1) i.d., at least in its application
against the appellant herein, violates due process in that it
is unconstitutionally vague.

"It is recognized that a

reasonable degree of certainty in a criminal statute is an
essential requirement of due process of law.

State v. Minns,

80 N.M. 269, 454 P.2d 355, 356 (1969) ."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
application violates the first essential of due
process. Connally v. General Construction Co.,
269 u.s. 385, 391 (1926).
In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 450 U.S.
156, 31 L. ed. 2d 110, 92 S. Ct. 839 (1972) the Supreme Court
held a municipal ordinance vague on the basis that the ordinance
failed to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice
of what acts were proscribed and also because such vague
enactments encourage arbitrary and erratic arrestsand convictions.

This concept was expanded in Grayned v. City of

Rockford, 408 U.S. 408, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222, 92 S. Ct. 2294

(1972):

It is a basic principle of due process that an
enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions
are not clearly defined. Vague laws offend several
important values. First because we assume that
man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful
conduct, we insist that laws give the person of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to
know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly
Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing
fair warning.
Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement is to be prevented laws must provide
explicit standards for those who apply them. A
vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy
matters to policemen, judges, and juries for
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with
the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory
application.
(footnote omitted) 408 U.S. at 108-109.
In ruling that qrticles of incorporation are a
writing for which the law provides "public recording", Judge
Croft hastened

to add, "I may be wrong".

lies the problem.

(T. 12 9)

Therein

There is much question as to what this
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"public recording" terminology means.
The case law in Utah applies the same stadards and
described factors that a court may consider in determining
if a statute is unconstitutionally vague.

See State v. Packard,

122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 560 (1952); Graves v. State, 528 P.2d
805 (Utah, 1974).
The statute in question should be held unconstitutionally vague for the reasons set forth herein as well
as those previously stated in Points I, II, and III.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
APPELLANTS MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE END OF THE
STATES CASE FOR THE REASON THAT THE STATE FAILED
TO MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE.
The State in its proof failed to marshall sufficient
evidence to warrant. submi tt:i,ng tre ·matter to .a<jln:)l

Reas-onable

minds could not differ in the opinion that sufficient proof
of the statutory requirement, "intent to deceive or injure",
§76-6-503, i.d., was not present to put appellant upon his
defense or submit the matter to the jury.
Although an inference may be considered with all
the other evidence in establishing guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, there nevertheless must be sufficient facts adduced
to entitle the state to have the case go to the jury because
the evidence is sufficient to counterbalance the general
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presumption of innocence Mantell v. Jones,
2d 115;

Neb. 36 N.W.

see also State v. Hall, 145 P.2d 494,

(Utah 1944)

There was not sufficient evidence to submit this
case to the jury and the state failed to prove out a
prima facie case.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above stated Appellant submits
that this action should be remanded with instructions to
the Trial Court to dismiss the action or for such other
relief as may be consistent with Appellant's position as stated
herein.

David Bown
Ronald Yengich
Herschel Bullen
Attorneys for Appellant
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